We study the causal impact of credit constraints on exporters using a natural experiment provided by two policy changes in India, first in 1998 which made small-scale firms eligible for subsidized direct credit, and a subsequent reversal in policy in 2000 wherein some of these firms lost their eligibility. Using firms that were not affected by these policy changes as our control group, we find that credit expansion increased the growth rate of bank borrowing and had a positive effect on exports.The subsequent policy reversal in 2000 had no impact on the growth rate of bank borrowing or on exports.
INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
Subsidized credit given by the government to exporting firms has played an important role in for bank credit within this set of firms. One possible effect of this increased competition for bank funds could be that firms with investment in plant and machinery of less than Rs. 6.5 million might suddenly become credit constrained having to compete with firms newly admitted to the priority sector (those with investment in plant and machinery between Rs. 6.5 million to Rs. 30 million). This is an important point which has implications for the interpretation of our results and our identification strategy. We note that from the policy point of view, simply allowing more firms to become eligible for priority sector lending doesn't ease the credit constraint for all firms below the cutoff because the total amount of credit remains the same. The purpose of our exercise is not to study the effectiveness of the policy in question but to use the policy change to study if firms are credit constrained and how they would respond to a relaxation of credit constraint. As far as the identification is concerned, since firms below 6.5 have to now compete with those between 6.5 and 30 for credit, they are at a disadvantage now, and therefore, it justifies including them in the control group.
lines of credit made available to State Industrial Development Corporation (SIDBI)/State Financial Cor-credit. The second policy change in 2000 was a reversal of the 1998 policy when some firms lost their 159 eligibility. We follow a two step procedure to isolate the effects on firm performance of these two policy 160 changes. First we study the impact of the expansion of credit on different variables of firm performance 161 and then we look at the impact of the subsequent contraction of credit on the same variables.
162
In our first step, we look at the impact of the credit expansion in 1998 on the rate of growth of 163 several financial and real variables for the firms that became newly eligible for priority sector lending in viz., (i) sales and (ii) exports. 9 10 We note that having the dependent variable in differenced form in the 168 above specification helps mitigate autocorrelation (for example, the current amount loaned could be very 169 strongly autocorrelated with past loans). T ime t is a time dummy for year t that controls for the general 170 time trends that affect all firms, SizeDumm y1 i is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm is 171 (newly) classified as a priority sector firm in 1998 or in 1999 (that is, if the firm has investment in plant 172 and machinery greater than Rs. 6.5 million but less than Rs. 30 million in 1998 or 1999) and is equal 173 to zero otherwise. This control group comprises of firms that were already in the priority sector 176 before 1998 (or older priority sector firms, i.e., those firms with investment in plant and machinery less 177 than Rs. 6.5 million) as also firms that were never in the priority sector (all other non-priority sector 178 firms with investment in plant and machinery greater than Rs. 30 million). Y earDumm y1 t is a dummy of all control variables and includes the size of the firm and dummy variables that control for industry 181 effects. 13 The coefficient of interest in the aforementioned regression is the coefficient on the interaction 182 term, β 3 , which measures the differential impact post the policy change of enhanced access to credit for 183 the newly defined priority sector firms compared to all firms that are not affected by the policy change 184 (see section 4.2 for an interpretation of the interaction term for the case of the specific dependent variable 185 that we use in our specification). The time period that we consider in this regression runs from t = 1994 186 to 2000.
14 187
8 For notational convenience we suppress the industry indicator j. 9 We define a firm as an exporting firm if it has exports of at least Rs. 1 million. At the current exchange rate this is equivalent to approximately $ 16,000 USD.
10 See the appendix for definitions of these variables. Note that sales in our paper refers to the total sales of the firm and not domestic sales. 11 See the appendix for the definition of plant and machinery. 12 We are using the standard difference-in-differences specification where the dependent variable is a growth rate itself (and not a level variable). For the difference-in-differences specification above, the coefficient of SizeDumm y1 i gives the difference in the growth rate of the variable of interest between treatment and control group firms in the pre-treatment period (or when Y earDumm y1 t = 0) whereas the coefficient on Y earDumm y1 t gives the difference in the growth rate of the variable of interest over pre and post treatment periods for the control group of firms (or when SizeDumm y1 t = 0). The coefficient on the interaction term SizeDumm y1 i * Y earDumm y1 t is the difference-in-differences estimator or a measure of the treatment effect. The difference-in-differences estimator gives the differential growth rate of treated firms compared to firms in the control group in the post-treatment period. 13 To control for the fact that the bank might be providing more cash towards bigger firms we use the size of the firm (using log sales) as control. We also need to account for the fact that lending rules for bank officials specify lending constraints based on the actual (not projected) firm sales. Industry dummies control for sector specific effects-for example different sectors may have been subjected to different industrial policies. 14 Recall that the reform was reversed in January 2000, so it did not affect credit decisions and availability post 2000.
In our second step, we run the following difference-in-differences regression: 
199
We note here that we also test the robustness of our main results from equations 1 and 2 earlier 200 to different control group specifications. For example, for the credit expansion phase, our control group 201 comprises of firms that were already in the priority sector before 1998 and also firms that were never in the 202 priority sector. These are two different groups of firms. The already priority sector firms have investment 203 in plant and machinery less than Rs. 6.5 million while firms that were never in the priority sector have 204 investment in plant and machinery greater than Rs. 30 million. To check the robustness of our results
205
we therefore run regression 1 with these two different control groups of firms (for details see section and machinery greater than Rs. 30 million. Again, we check the robustness of our results for the credit 210 contraction phase by running regression 2 with these these two different groups of firms (for details see 211 section 4.4.1). We also note here that our dependent variable is itself the growth rate of a variable. The 212 "standard" difference-in-differences specification allows for levels of the dependent variable to be different 213 for treatment and control groups. It requires that the trends in treatment and control groups be the same.
214
In our case, since the dependent variable is itself a growth rate we require the trends in the growth rates 215 for treatment and control group firms to be the same. This is a much weaker identification requirement 216 since a-priori there is no reason to believe that the growth rates for treatment and control group firms 217 should be any different. (for details see section 4.2). This is important since our main result involves 218 comparing a treatment group with control groups that comprise of very different groups of firms.
219
Before we present our results, it is important to discuss the possible behavior of credit constrained 220 firms vis-a-vis unconstrained firms in response to these policy changes. As discussed in Bannerjee and Du-221 flo [2014] , when new firms are classified as priority sector firms, then both constrained and unconstrained 222 firms would be willing to absorb more credit if it is cheaper than other existing sources of credit. However,
223
a constrained firm will use this credit primarily to expand output/sales whereas an unconstrained firm 224 will use this credit primarily as a substitute for other more expensive sources of credit. An opposite set 225 of conclusions holds for the credit contraction phase of the policy change. As a result, for unconstrained 226 firms, we should see a much larger effect of the policy change on the profitability of the firm while we 227 should see little or no impact on the sales of the firm. In contrast, for constrained firms, we should see a 228 substantial impact of the policy change on the sales (either domestic or foreign) of the firm. 15 The rationale for these results is straightforward. If a firm is credit constrained then by definition, the marginal product of capital is higher than the rate of interest on the marginal amount borrowed. If such a firm is offered credit that is cheaper than the ongoing market 4.2. Identification Issues. We now note some issues with the regression specifications 1 and 2 vis-a-vis 230 identification. First, note that the policy change was exogenous at least with respect to our main variable 231 of interest -exports. The policy was not implemented or targeted at exporting firms specifically. That is 232 the thrust of the policy was not to increase export earnings of firms. So the treatment could be considered 233 as exogenous at least for our main outcome variable. 16 Moreover, as the criterion for priority sector lending 234 was based on the plant and machinery in the firm, it was also not possible for firms to sort themselves 235 below the threshold and get subsidized credit. Second, the dependent variable in our specification in 236 equations 1 and 2 is itself a growth rate (unlike in conventional difference-in-differences specifications 237 where the dependent variable is usually in levels). Our formulation is similar to the specification used in Bannerjee and Duflo [2014] call a "triple difference"). We note that for the specification given in 1 and 2 the 244 identification assumption is that in the absence of treatment or the policy change there are no differential 245 changes in the growth rates for treatment and control firms (which can happen if treatment group firms 246 would have grown faster anyway, for example). So the assumption underlying our identification strategy 247 is that treated firms would have the same trends for the growth rates of the variables under study had 248 they not been treated. The counterfactual trend for the treatment group (or the counterfactual growth 249 rate in our case) is of course never observed. The best that we can do in this case is to show the trend in 250 the growth rates for different variables in the pre-treatment period to strengthen identification.
251
So to this end we show plots of the growth rates of treatment and control group firms in the pre-252 treatment period for major variables of interest, viz., sales and exports. These are average growth rates for 253 the treatment and control group firms for each year for these two variables. We also show the numerical 254 values of the growth rates for these two variables in the plots itself.
255

[Insert figure 1]
256
For our two key variables of interest, sales and exports, we show plots of these variables in figure 1.
257
Before we discuss figure 1, recall the definition of treatment and control group of firms in each phase of 258 the policy change. Recall that for the credit expansion phase of the policy change treated firms are firms 259 with an investment between Rs. 6.5 to Rs. 30 million in 1998 which are the newly emergent priority sector 260 firms and control group comprises of all other firms. Recall also that for the credit contraction phase of the 261 policy change treated firms are firms with an investment in plant and machinery between Rs. 10 to Rs. 30 262 million in 2000 which are the firms that are removed from the priority sector and all other firms are in the 263 control group. We note that the treatment group during the credit contraction phase of the policy change
264
(which comprises of firms that were removed from the priority sector or firms with an investment in plant 265 and machinery between Rs. 10 to Rs. 30 million) comprises a large fraction of the firms that are treated 266 rate, the firm will use this credit to invest in capital until the marginal rate of capital is equal to the interest rate. In contrast, a firm that is not credit constrained will use this cheap credit to payoff its outstanding debts.
16 Priority sector lending has a long history going back to the time right after India's independence with the setup of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) in 1951. The RBI is the central bank of the country and it also has the remit for priority sector lending. The RBI directs changes in priority sector lending with a goal to make credit accessible and thereby help in general development. The RBI has made continued efforts to facilitate availability of credit to specific sectors of the economy deemed to be in need of credit. Since independence the thrust of the RBI (and of successive governments in India at the center) in facilitating credit access has been evident in the policies pursued by the RBI (and the government). These policies include nationalization of banks (in two waves -one in 1969 and another in 1980), increasing the breadth and scope of the banking sector (for example, by requiring branches to be set up in rural parts of the country), etc. The policies that we are concerned with in our paper are a natural continuation of the efforts of the RBI (and of successive Indian governments) to provide (a pre-allotted portion of banks') funds to a few specific sectors (including among other sectors, micro and small scale enterprises). Keeping these facts in mind we are very skeptical if these policies were designed specifically for export promotion allaying any concerns regarding endogeneity for our main outcome of interest -exports. We also note that the work by Bannerjee, Cole, We focus attention on the interaction term which is the difference-in-differences estimate (recall that in 290 our case this is a growth rate difference). We find from table 2 that the coefficient of the interaction term indicates that relative to firms in the control group, firms in the treatment group enjoyed a higher growth 294 of bank borrowing. On average, the rate of growth of short-term bank borrowing for newly emergent 295 priority sector firms increased by approximately 17 percent (relative to control group firms) following the 296 policy change in 1998. Total bank borrowing of these firms increased by around 20 percent.
17
We also find 297 that the policy change in 1998 had no effect on the rate of growth of sales of the firm.
18
Our key result is 298 the impact of the policy change on the rate of growth of exports. We find that the growth rate of exports 299 for treated firms increased by approximately 24 percent compared to the growth rate for control group 300 firms. So, the major impact of the enhanced access to credit for exporting firms was on the exports of these 301 firms. This is an important result. Exporting firms have to incur large sunk costs to break into export 302 markets which have to be paid up front.
19
We observe that the growth in credit is matched by a growth 303 17 As Bannerjee and Duflo [2014] point out, lending to smaller clients is more costly and so ex-ante one should expect that banks would be saving on the cost of the cost of lending if they shifted their lending to the larger firms that newly became part of the priority sector. Of course, post reform the banks could be more selective in their choice of clients to fill in their priority sector quota. For both of these reasons the new members in the priority sector (or our treatment of firms) should by receiving more credit relative to firm already in the priority sector. 18 We note that the coefficient on sales has the correct sign but is not statistically significant. We note that sales in our paper refers to total sales and not domestic sales. It might be interesting (and we thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out) to look only at domestic sales instead of total sales since domestic sales are arguably not dependent on the supply of credit while foreign (and by extension total sales) are. Unfortunately, CMIE does not provide data on (exclusively) domestic sales. 19 See the empirical literature, for example, Roberts and Tybout [1995] for an example of hysteresis effects in export markets. Note that we are looking at the intensive margin where working capital is more important. The firms that are exporters have already managed to break into export markets (they changed the extensive margin when they entered the export market) and to do that they would likely have in exports -a clear indication of credit constrained behaviour. credit expansion phase of the policy change. These robustness exercises are described below. As our first 311 exercise, we check the robustness of our results to alternative control groups during the credit expansion 312 phase of the policy change. As mentioned earlier in section 4, the control group for the specification 313 in regression 1 reported in table 2 comprises of firms that that were already in the priority sector (the 314 older priority sector firms, i.e., those firms with investment in plant and machinery less than Rs. 6.5 315 million) and also firms that were never in the priority sector (all other non-priority sector firms with 316 investment in plant and machinery greater than Rs. 30 million). These two groups of firms have different 317 firm characteristics which might lead the policy changes to have different impact on firms outcomes.
318
So we repeat our difference-in-differences exercise with different control groups of firms (with the same 319 treatment group of firms).
320
We now consider regression 1 but now only with the sample of firms that were always in the priority 321 sector as our control group. These firms are small sized firms with investment in plant and machinery less priority sector firms (although not all of these coefficients are significant at the conventional levels of 326 significance). These results seem to suggest that compared to the small firms that were already in the 327 priority sector newly emergent priority sector firms were also growing faster post-reform than pre-reform 328 which reinforces the claim of credit constrained behaviour. Our most important result is the effect that 329 the credit expansion has on the exports of the new priority sector firms. Once again we obtain a positive 330 difference in the growth rates of exports between the treatment group of new priority sector firms and the
331
(new) control group of firms that were always in the priority sector. So, newly emergent priority sector 332 firms were having faster growth in real variables compared to the firms that were fortunate enough to be 333 always in the priority sector.
334
Next, we once again restrict the sample size and now consider as a control group only those firms 335 that were never in the priority sector. These are firms that had an investment in plant and machinery of 336 more than Rs. 30 million. The result of this regression is reported in table 2 under the header "Only large 337 firms as control". These results show a similar positive growth differential for newly emergent priority 338 sector firms which suggests that during the credit expansion phase of the policy change newly emergent 339 priority sector firms were growing faster than larger firms never in the priority sector. The signs of 340 the coefficients on the interaction term for all variables is positive. We note in particular the positive 341 coefficient on exports. Overall from the results table 2, we can conclude that our result of a positive effect 342 on real firm outcomes for treatment group firms during the credit expansion part of the policy change is 343 quite robust to alternative specifications involving different control groups of firms. to be financially sound (the extant literature has clearly linked breaking into export markets and financial strength) -and yet these same firms behave like they were credit constrained when they are offered priority credit. So it is surprising result that even firms that manage to break into export markets incurring considerable sunk costs still face such working capital constraints later.
20 It may be argued here that if credit has expanded then interest payments must also expand. However, the likely reason for not finding this result is because the firms have partly substituted the more expensive credit with now the relatively cheaper credit from the banks (even though the banks offered the same interest rate) and also expanded their credit from banks. As a result the overall interest payments might not change even though the firms are borrowing lot more, because interest payments include all the interest payments. was that banks could now either reduce the credit limit to these firms or maintain the same credit limit 350 depending on the firm's performance.
351
The results of the regression for the credit contraction phase are reported in 
366
These results show that the effects of the credit contraction phase of the policy change are quite
367
different from what we would expect a-priori -removal of firms from the priority sector does not seem to 368 affect either the credit given to these firms or firm outcomes like sales or exports. Our explanation for this 369 result is the following. As discussed earlier, the Indian banking system is characterized by under-lending 370 primarily due to the rigid lending policies, inertia and the fear of prosecution by public loan officers.
371
In 1998, after the change in the definition of SSI, the banks were compelled under the priority sector 372 regulation to increase their limits to the newly classified priority sector firms. As a result of this enhanced 373 access to credit, firms were able to grow rapidly and increase their turnover (as measured by the growth 374 in the turnover of these firms). However, in 2000, when these firms were declassified as priority sector 375 firms, the banks still followed their stringent lending policy but given the performance of the firms, there with an investment in plant and machinery less than Rs. 10 million as also the larger firms with an 383 investment in plant and machinery greater than Rs. 30 million that were never in the priority sector. shows the average yearly growth rates in the pre-treatment period (treatment takes place in 1998) for real outcome variables -sales and exports. Treated firms are firms with investment in plant and machinery between Rs.10 to Rs. 30 million. These firms are treated during the credit expansion phase of the policy change in 1998 when they receive subsidized credit and again in 2000 when they are removed from the priority sector. All other firms are in the control group. Note that firms with investment in plant and machinery between Rs.6.5 to Rs. 10 million which were treated during the credit expansion phase as not all these firms are removed from the priority sector during the credit contraction phase. Each column represents the dependent variable in a regression on SizeDummy1, YearDummy1 and SizeDummy1*YearDummy1(the difference-in-differences estimator). All regressions include time dummies and control for firm size using log sales as control. The time period covered by this regression is from 1994 to 2000. ‡ The treatment group comprises of firms with investment in plant and machinery between Rs. 6.5 million and Rs. 30 million in 1998 or in 1999 which newly became part of priority sector and the control group comprises of firms with investment in plant and machinery below Rs. 6.5 million which were always part of priority sector and firms with investment in plant and machinery greater than Rs. 30 million which were never part of priority sector. ‡ ‡ The treatment group comprises of firms with investment in plant and machinery between Rs. 6.5 million and Rs. 30 million in 1998 or in 1999 which newly became part of priority sector and the control group comprises of firms with investment in plant and machinery below Rs. 6.5 million which were always part of priority sector. ‡ ‡ ‡ The treatment group comprises of firms with investment in plant and machinery between Rs. 6.5 million and Rs. 30 million in 1998 or in 1999 which newly became part of priority sector and the control group comprises of firms with investment in plant and machinery above Rs. 30 million which were never part of the priority sector. § Note : t-statistics reported under each coefficient in parenthesis. Significance at : + p < 0.10 * p < 0.05, * * p < 0.01, * * * p < 0.001.Standard errors are clustered at the (3-digit) industry level. were removed from the priority sector and the control group comprises of firms with investment in plant and machinery below Rs.10 million and firms with investment in plant and machinery greater than Rs.30 million. ‡ ‡ The treatment group comprises of firms with investment in plant and machinery between Rs.10 million and Rs.30 million in 2000 which were removed from the priority sector and the control group comprises of firms with investment in plant and machinery below Rs.10 million. ‡ ‡ ‡ The treatment group comprises of firms with investment in plant and machinery between Rs. 10 million and Rs. 30 million in 2000 which were removed from priority sector and the control group comprises of firms with investment in plant and machinery above Rs. 30 million. § Note : t-statistics reported under each coefficient in parenthesis. Significance at : + p < 0.10 * p < 0.05, * * p < 0.01, * * * p < 0.001.Standard errors are clustered at the (3-digit) industry level. ‡ The treatment group comprises of firms with investment in plant and machinery between Rs. 6.5 million and Rs. 30 million in 1998 or in 1999 which newly became part of priority sector and the control group comprises of firms with investment in plant and machinery below Rs. 6.5 million which were always part of priority sector and firms with investment in plant and machinery greater than Rs. 30 million which were never part of priority sector. ‡ ‡ The treatment group comprises of firms with investment in plant and machinery between Rs. 6.5 million and Rs. 30 million which newly became part of priority sector and the control group comprises of firms with investment in plant and machinery below Rs. 6.5 million which were always part of priority sector. ‡ ‡ ‡ The treatment group comprises of firms with investment in plant and machinery between Rs. 6.5 million and Rs. 30 million in 1998 or in 1999 which newly became part of priority sector and the control group comprises of firms with investment in plant and machinery above Rs. 30 million which were never part of the priority sector. § Note : t-statistics reported under each coefficient in parenthesis. Significance at : + p < 0.10 * p < 0.05, * * p < 0.01, * * * p < 0.001.Standard errors are clustered at the (3-digit) industry level. were removed from the priority sector and the control group comprises of firms with investment in plant and machinery below Rs.10 million and firms with investment in plant and machinery greater than Rs.30 million. ‡ ‡ The treatment group comprises of firms with investment in plant and machinery between Rs. 10 million and Rs. 30 million in 2000 which were removed from priority sector and the control group comprises of firms with investment in plant and machinery below Rs. 10 million. ‡ ‡ ‡ The treatment group comprises of firms with investment in plant and machinery between Rs. 10 million and Rs. 30 million in 2000 which were removed from priority sector and the control group comprises of firms with investment in plant and machinery above Rs. 30 million. § Note : t-statistics reported under each coefficient in parenthesis. Significance at : + p < 0.10 * p < 0.05, * * p < 0.01, * * * p < 0.001.Standard errors are clustered at the (3-digit) industry level.
APPENDIX
445
Definitions. The following are definitions of variables used in the paper and are taken verbatim from 446 the "Data Dictionary" accompanying the Prowess Database.
447
(1) Total Bank borrowing This is the total of loans sourced from banks. It includes loans from banks 448 in the form of cash credit, bank overdraft facilities, term loans, etc.
449
(2) Sales is the sum of industrial sales and income from non-financial services. 
